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NAFTA AND THE USA-COLOMBIA FTA: 




Back in 1992, a commercial agreement was signed between USA and Mexico (and Canada), which 
was supposed to promote the economic growth of its members by removing barriers to trade and 
investment among the three nations. Twenty years later, some studies indicates that the US have 
lost more jobs than those created by the agreement and moved from positive to negative trade 
balance with Mexico, all that due to American companies reallocating their production in Mexico, 
limiting the possibilities of higher wage claims for low-income workers in USA. Mexico, on the other 
hand, has not seen the positive impact on manufacturing wages NAFTA was supposed to exert. 
Based on this experience, what can be expected from the Free Trade Agreement between USA 
and Colombia in force since May 2012, since it is expected to achieve similar goals than NAFTA 
using similar policies?
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RESUMEN
En el año 1992, Estados Unidos, México (y Canadá) firmaron un acuerdo comercial con el fin 
de promover el desarrollo económico de sus miembros a través de la eliminación de barreras al 
comercio y la inversión entre las tres naciones. Veinte años más tarde, algunos estudios indican 
que Estados Unidos ha perdido más trabajos de los que el Tratado ha creado; ha convertido en 
negativo el otrora positivo balance comercial con México, como consecuencia de la reubicación 
de empresas americanas en México y ha reducido las posibilidades de mejores sueldos entre los 
trabajadores de bajos ingresos en Estados Unidos. México, por su parte, no ha visto los esperados 
impactos positivos en los sueldos del sector manufacturero. Basados en esta experiencia, ¿qué 
puede esperarse del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos y Colombia puesto en mar-
cha en mayo de 2012, siendo que dicho tratado plantea utilizar políticas similares para alcanzar 
objetivos también similares?
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RESUMO
Em 1992, Estados Unidos, México (e Canadá) assinaram um acordo de comércio, a fim de promover 
o desenvolvimento económico dos seus membros através da eliminação das barreiras ao comércio 
e investimento entre as três nações. Vinte anos depois, alguns estudos indicam que o Estados 
Unidos perdeu mais trabalho que criouse o Tratado; tornouse negativo o saldo antigo positiva 
comércio com o México, devido a deslocalização de americano empresas no México e reduziu as 
possibilidades de melhores salários entre os trabalhadores de baixa renda dos Estados Unidos. 
México, por sua vez, não viu o impacto positivo esperado sobre os salários no setor industrial. Com 
base nessa experiência, o que pode esperar o acordo de livre comércio entre Estados Unidos e 
Colômbia, lançado em maio de 2012, sendo que esse Tratado gera usar políticas semelhantes 
também semelhantes objectivos?
Palavras chave: TNALC, EUA-Colombia TLC, integração económica.
JEL: F15
1. INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, nations all over the world have 
seemed to experience the need for creating allian-
ces and signing agreements intended to facilitate 
the trading of goods and services, and sometimes 
even factors of production, among them. Most of 
these agreements end up just been goodwill letters 
and are eventually forgotten. Others evolve to reach 
higher and more complicated levels of integration. 
Globalization forces the nations into opening their 
markets and exposes their economies to inter-
national forces, whether they are ready or not to 
deal with the opportunities and problems this may 
generate. Along with this globalizing process, the-
re is another one that seems to work in opposite 
direction: regions tending to create alliances with 
selected members but imposing barriers to others. 
Many have been the attempts of economic integra-
tion in Latin America since the 1980s, probably due 
to the need for a bigger and not that competitive 
market, although most of the products they could 
trade were similar. CARICOM1 (1978), Mercosur2 
1 Caribbean Community: 15 Caribbean nations. 
2 Southern Common Market: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
(1991), NAFTA3 (1992), G34 (1995), CAN5 (1996), 
and more recently ALBA6 (2004), and CELAC7 
(2010) are just some of them. In addition, a series 
of bilateral agreements has been signed between 
countries, creating a complex network of relation-
ships that point out the lack of a clear direction 
and the competition among countries. Particularly 
in Latin America, the US has signed free trade 
agreements with Chile (2004); El Salvador, Hondu-
ras, Nicaragua and Guatemala (2006); Dominican 
Republic and Panama (2007); Costa Rica and 
Peru (2009).
The appearance of Asian economies in this sce-
nario has contributed to accelerate and reinforce 
the creation of new and stronger alliances, given 
the special interest shown by emerging economies 
such as China and South Korea on Latin American 
countries. That is why right now it is so common to 
see free trade agreements signed among countries 
from these two continents and explains, in part, the
3 North American Free Trade Agreement: USA, Canada and Mexico. 
4 G3: Colombia, Mexico (and Venezuela until 2006).
5 Andean Community: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. (Ven-
ezuela until 2006 and Chile between 1969-1976)
6 Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America: Mostly a political 
project promoted by Cuba and Venezuela. Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines and Venezuela.
7 Community of Latin American and Caribbean States: 33 members. 
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interest of the USA on a free trade agreement with 
both Colombia and Korea. 
This paper is organized a follows. In the next sec-
tion the purposes of NAFTA are refreshed, and the 
evolution of such an agreement is summarized, 
paying special attention to its incidence in the labor 
market, and focusing on Mexico and the USA, in 
order to create a proper scenario for the analysis 
of the agreement with Colombia. In a third section, 
the goals of the free trade agreement between Co-
lombia and the USA are analyzed in the light of the 
experienced obtained from NAFTA. Finally some 
conclusions are presented.
2. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT, NAFTA
2.1 GENERAL IDEAS
NAFTA is a complex document with more than 
1,000 pages signed by USA, Canada and Mexico in 
1992 and started in 1994, with the purpose of facili-
tating the commercial trade among them, especially 
in the textile and automotive industries, through a 
tariff and non-tariff barriers gradually elimination 
program. By doing so, the country members expec-
ted to improve their economies by promoting the 
commercial trade, attract investments, create jobs 
and improve wages, as well as reduce inequalities 
among members.
Opponents were mainly concerned about the im-
pact of the agreement on the labor market since, 
according to them, cheap imports from Mexico and 
capital flows to that country would destroy jobs in 
the US. Supporters, on the other hand, considered 
that US consumers and producers would beneficia-
te from cheap final and intermediate goods, while 
Mexico’s economy would grow with the exports to 
the US, which would create jobs in that country 
and contribute to discourage migration (Burfisher 
et al., 2001).
Like any other free trade agreement, the alliance 
among these three countries does not go beyond 
expanding trade, exchanging knowledge and servi-
ces and promoting investments. In other words, the 
agreement does not intervene in the policy design 
process of each country member. In that sense, 
it is just at second level in a five-level integration 
process:
•	 Preferred Trade Agreement: reduction of ba-
rriers to international trade among members.
•	 Free Trade Agreement: elimination of all ba-
rriers to international trade of goods and ser-
vices among members, which are still free to 
define	their	own	international	policy	with	respect	
to other non-member countries.
•	 Customs Union: free trade area with a common 
external tariff applicable to non-members. 
•	 Common Market: Customs union with free 
mobility of capital and labor resources. 
•	 Economic Union: Common market with com-
mon macroeconomic and social policies. 
In almost every trade agreement signed, economic 
inequalities among countries are the main reasons 
for it and, at the same time, the main obstacle. This 
is because all parts are considering these alliances 
as ways to improve their economies, knowingly 
that their economies will be impacted in different 
ways, and the efforts for fulfilling the terms of the 
agreement may not be the same for all of them. 
By the time NAFTA was signed, USA per capita 
income was four times the one observed in Mexico, 
although its population was one third of the one in 
the US; its Gini coefficient was 0.13 points smaller; 
the illiteracy index just 1% while Mexico´s was 
above 10%, and the infant mortality rate was 3.5 
times smaller. The international debt of the first was 
10.4% of the GDP, compared to 44.2% in Mexico. 
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Both countries did not have strong unemployment 
problems but prices in Mexico were growing up 
at 24% a year on average, (3% in USA), situation 
that apparently led to the creation in 1993 of a new 
currency (nuevo –new– peso) in a proportion of 1 
to 1000. In addition, Mexico was a country trying 
to solve guerrilla8 problems and overwhelmed by 
high levels of poverty (see table 1).
However, geographical proximity is an important 
factor in the integration process, which explains 
that, in spite of these inequalities, Mexico was the 
USA´s third most important trade partner (9.1% 
imports and 9.4% exports), after Canada and Ja-
pan, and as expected, USA was the Mexico´s most 
important one (75.5% imports and 84.2% exports). 
USA had a positive trade balance with Mexico y 
contributed with 86.95% of the total product within 
NAFTA.
The opening process of three economies in NAFTA 
did not start with the agreement. USA and Canada 
already had a bilateral trade agreement since at 
least five years and Mexico, unilaterally, had started 
to remove barriers to international trade, moving 
away from its strong protectionist policy almost ten 
years before. NAFTA just formalized these chan-
ges. Because of that, it is quite difficult to distinguish 
the effects of NAFTA from the impact of all these 
other changes that took place right before. 
Table 1. The US and Mexico before NAFTA (1992)
USA Mexico
Per capita income ($) 24,508 6,920
Population (millions) 252 84
Gini coefficient 0.32 0.45
Illiteracy index (%) 1.0 10.6
External debt (% GDP) 10.4 44.2
Average inflation rate (%) 3.0 15.51
Unemployment rate (%) 7.5 3.1
Social issues GuerrillaPoverty: 17.6%
Sources: elaborated by the authors based on information from De-
partment of Commerce y Bureau of Labour Statistics; México and Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI) y Dirección 
General de Inversión Extranjera de Secretaría de Economía (DGIE-SE)
8 Guerrilla or “Little war” is a form of irregular warfare.
There exists a very rich literature regarding the 
effects of NAFTA on its members´ economies. For 
the purposes of this paper, we would ignore Canada 
and we will stress its impacts on Mexico and USA, 
considering this as a good framework to analyze 
what can be expected from the recently enforced 
free trade agreement between USA and Colombia. 
When reading through it, the main conclusion we 
can reach is that it is not clear whether or not NAFTA 
succeeded in its purposes. Most articles indicate 
that if there were any positive impact, it beneficiated 
Mexico more than USA. For others, only negative 
effects can be observed. What is clear is that no 
article considers the agreement as very successful. 
Let us see some of them, in a sort of meta-analysis, 
to finally set the bases to consider the effects on 
each country´s labor market.
2.2 TRADE BALANCE
Three products were particularly important in the 
commercial trade between Mexico and the USA: 
Corn, automotive and textiles. Among them, corn 
was of a special concern for both countries. 
By the early 1990s, the Mexican rural labor market 
was about 25% of the total labor force and corn 
was the main product. It was produced mostly by 
a large number of small labor intensive farms (61% 
of farms were smaller than 5 hectares), as reported 
by the 1991 Mexico´s National Agricultural and 
Livestock Census, condition that has not changed 
that much since then. This fragmentation of agri-
cultural production was the result of redistributive 
farmland policies very common in Latin America 
during the 50s and 60s. The general expectation 
was that with NAFTA, the US grain exports to 
Mexico would collapse Mexico´s rural labor market 
promoting immigration of unskilled workers to the 
US. Fortunately, both countries produce different 
kind of corn: US produces white corn for human 
consumption while Mexico produces yellow corn 
better suited for animal feeding purposes. Because 
of this, corn production in both countries increased 
with NAFTA, faster in Mexico than in the US due 
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to Mexican government supporting domestically 
produced white corn and the adoption of better 
technology by Mexican farmers. 
During the period 1993-2002 Mexican exports to 
the US increased by 135.5% while imports increa-
sed by 237.4%, but still managed to end up with a 
positive balance. This fact may explain the substi-
tution effect toward imported products in Mexico’s 
consumption (16.1% imported products in 1993 
compared to 26.8% in 2003). Mexican exports 
to the US where mainly manufacturing products 
(81.1%), oil (15.6%) and less than 3% agricultural 
products (Vázquez, 2004), proportions that have 
not changed significantly, not yet their composition. 
According to the World Bank, by 2010 exports ac-
counted for 32% of Mexico´s GDP; 80% of these 
exports were headed to the US, meaning that with 
or without NAFTA the trade between these two 
countries remains at the same level of importance: 
the US is still the Mexico´s most important trade 
partner and Mexico is still the US´s third one, after 
Canada and, now, China. The former $1.6 million 
US trade surplus with Mexico that used to support 
29,000 jobs in that country, changed into a $97.2 
billion trade deficit, near ten times larger than the 
surplus predicted.
Several studies conclude that this negative balance 
is due to macroeconomic trends following business 
cycles, rather than to NAFTA. Particularly, Burfisher 
et al. (2001) consider that the effects on a country’s 
aggregate trade balance cannot be attributed to 
regional trade liberalization unless it determines 
a country’s commitment to an open development 
strategy, which is not the case for USA. After all, 
the two-way trade with Mexico amounts less than 
3% of the US GDP.
Still, some studies stress the importance of such 
a trade deficit, especially because NAFTA was 
supposed to lead to a trade surplus with Mexico 
resulting from the expectation that US exports to 
Mexico would expand faster than US imports from 
Mexico, since barriers to trade in Mexico were much 
higher than in the former, creating thousands and 
thousands of jobs. 
2.3 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The reasons for the US trade deficit with Mexico 
can be explained by the rapidly growing inves-
tments in Mexico form private investors trying to 
take advantage of the duty free access to the US 
market as well as lower labor costs. According to 
Scott (2011), NAFTA made Mexico a safer and 
attractive place for investors to outsource the US 
manufacturing production thanks to mechanisms 
for solving disputes that were part of the agreement.
With NAFTA, investments in Mexico grew up at 
2.9% a year, on average, almost three times the 
rate before the agreement. The US was the largest 
source of foreign direct investment in Mexico, going 
from $17 billion in 1994 to $97.9 billion in 2009, at a 
rate of 477% (Villarreal, 2011). And that was actually 
what Mexico was looking for by opening its markets. 
Most of these investments took place during the 
first years after the agreement was enforced. After 
that, the US investments in Mexico decreased as 
well as the trade as the result of the 2008 crisis, 
the increased violence in Mexico, especially at 
Northern Border States, and the increasing role of 
China in the international market (Grijalba, 2004). 
Most of these investments went to the manufactu-
ring industry as maquilas9, whose number expan-
ded from 1,920 in 1990 to 3,590 in 2000. In total, 
5,245 export assembly plants (maquilas and other 
manufacturing) existed in Mexico by 2009, textile 
apparel and automotive industries being the main 
target. After all, key provisions of NAFTA encourage 
investment liberalization probably more than trade 
liberalization10. 
9 Factories that import material and equipment on tariff free basis for 
manufacturing and re-export  the products back to the country of origin. 
10 NAFTA protects property rights of investors and any other type of 
ownership interests, actual or expected, including protection against 
any arbitrary change of government regulations. In this way, foreign 
investors must be treated as national so that they can even create 
alliances that affect regulations (induce or reject changes in them).
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Because of this, according to the World Bank, NAF-
TA helped Mexico to raise its level of development 
and decline Mexico’s macroeconomic instability, 
by making Mexican manufacturing firms to adopt 
better technology faster than what would have been 
the case without NAFTA, with a positive impact on 
jobs. According to Villarreal (2011), foreign direct 
investments in Mexico would have been 4% lower 
if not for NAFTA. Therefore, the impact of the treaty 
at this regard is obviously stronger in Mexico than 
in USA. After all, Mexican direct investment in the 
US was just $11.4 billion. And it was Mexico the one 
that was able to generate jobs from that investment. 
Of course not everything is perfect. It is well known 
that maquilas have a minimum level of integration 
with the local economy where they are placed 
(outsourcing from other industries is just about 2 
to 3%) and therefore do not help to develop other 
sectors. Also, the effects of these investments were 
mostly observed at Border States, which deepened 
differences across regions in Mexico. The problem 
is that, with foreign direct investment also came the 
control of the Mexican banking system by foreign 
investors, putting in their hands a fundamental key 
for Mexico’s development.
2.4 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Expectations indicated that, with NAFTA, Mexico’s 
economy would grow between 6 and 12% while the 
US economy would only grow at less than 0.5%. 
The explanation was the relative importance of the 
two countries on their respective trade balance and 
the level of reduction in barriers, which in the US 
was smaller since there were almost no barriers 
to reduce.
Before NAFTA, Mexico´s GDP was growing at 1% 
on average. In 1995 the GDP decreased 6.2%, 
probably due to the 1994 peso crisis and subse-
quence devaluation. Between 1996 and 2000 the 
economy grew up at rates oscillating between 
3.6% and 6.8% to go back to less than 1% after 
that. Therefore the Mexican economy has been 
fluctuating without a clear trend, so that no stability 
was achieved with NAFTA. The US economy has 
also shown fluctuations, not as deep as those in 
Mexico, not attributable to the evolution of GDP in 
that other country but to internal macroeconomic 
issues and the international scenario. 
As for the peso crisis itself, there is no agreement 
about its relation with NAFTA. Several papers con-
clude that such a crisis cannot be related to NAFTA, 
and even consider that NAFTA softened the effects 
of the crisis on the Mexican economy, since border 
states experienced less wage reduction, unemplo-
yment and informality than other regions, and even 
beneficiated from devaluation. Others attribute the 
crisis to capital inflows into Mexico that could not be 
controlled by the authorities due to both the protec-
tionist policies they were used to, and the influence 
of foreign investors in the financial system also as 
result of the agreement (Blecker, 1997). 
This economic grow was not enough as to offset 
or at least smooth income inequalities between the 
two countries, even though it is true that some so-
cial and economic sectors became more dynamic. 
If the US per capita income was 4 times the one in 
Mexico before NAFTA and 5 times higher by 2007. 
Moreover, the number of homes under poverty 
increased between 1991 and 2006, although this 
may be also explained by the availability of more 
accurate statistics. 
This positive but poor effect of NAFTA on the 
Mexican economic grow may be explained again 
by the lack of interaction of the maquilas with other 
sectors. The foreign direct investment just genera-
ted employment at the border, especially Ciudad 
Juarez and Tijuana, deepening heterogeneity and 
inequalities among workers, productive sectors and 
regions in Mexico. For example, population at Bor-
der States grew much faster than in other Mexican 
states. Only activities such as trade, manufacturing 
and services experienced a significant expansion 
in those states; construction remained the same, 
and the primary sector even decreased. Besides, 
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maquilas may be perceived as fast sources of 
employment, but they are regressive in terms of 
wages and working conditions. 
Campbell et al. (1999) point out the dualization 
of the Mexican economy: on one side, one sector 
formed by traditional firms focused on the internal 
market, trying to survive in a much more compe-
titive environment after years of protection from 
the government; on the other side, an open sector 
formed by exporting firms and maquilas. Just a 
few traditional firms were able to cross the line and 
adapt themselves to the new situation: beer (Coro-
na), cement (CEMEX), home appliances (MABE in 
alliance with General Electric), textiles, steel, glass 
and automotive, most of them beneficiated from 
third country competition. 
Transnational penetration in the highest profitable 
areas, such as education and health, was promoted 
by both pressures to privatize these sectors to make 
them more competitive and the reduced ability of 
Mexican government to protect strategic sectors 
from competitors. 
2.5 LABOR MARKET
According to NAFTA proponents, the treaty would 
lead to thousands of new jobs in the US resulting 
from trade surplus with Mexico. In addition to that, 
the US imports from Mexico and the incentives to 
invest in that country would help Mexico´s economy 
to grow, creating more jobs in equality of conditions, 
reducing immigration incentives and wage inequali-
ties. However, the general thought is that evidence 
does not satisfy expectations. 
Even though there exist a great deal of controver-
sies about the adequacy of maquilas to contribute 
to the economic development of the region where 
they are placed, it is true that after more than 20 
years Mexico has become a pillar of the manufactu-
ring industry for exporting purposes. An advantage 
of the maquilas is that they are a direct source of 
employment. 
According to Coubés (2003) NAFTA generated 
positive changes in the Mexican labor market by 
creating more employment and reducing informa-
lity. Particularly in the automotive industry 30,400 
jobs were created in Mexico in 2010, compared 
to 24,700 in the US (Scott, 2011). Between 1990 
and 2000, export oriented maquilas created 
1,250,000 new jobs in Mexico to produce 47.7% 
of the Nation´s total exports. 83% of these jobs 
were in Border States where 73% of the maquilas 
were located: Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, 
Coahuila and Tamaulipas (Grijalba, 2004). Women 
entered the labor market at a rate higher than men 
(8% compared to 3.9%), especially in trading, 
manufacturing and public administration activities. 
70,000 of the jobs created by maquilas were in the 
apparel industry. 
In this way, Mexico´s northern Border States be-
neficiated differently from the rest of the country, 
creating a reallocation of productive capacities. 
But not all the effects were positive. Just the peso 
crisis, attributable to NAFTA according to some, 
destroyed millions of jobs in Mexico. Maquilas and 
competition with US farming products reallocated 
resources away from the primary sector were most 
men were employed. In spite of the increasing 
production of corn, Mexico lost 1.3 million jobs in 
the agricultural sector as the result of cheap and 
subsidized corn from the US and the introduction 
of new technology. 
After year 2000 many maquilas left Mexico and 
moved to emerging countries, negatively affec-
ting the employment in the region, aggravated by 
the fact that they never helped to promote other 
sectors. According to Mora (2007) jobs created 
in Mexico as the result of the increase in exports 
are less than those destroyed by the increase in 
imports. This may explain that, by 2005, informality 
was 26% of the total employment and that by 2010 
there were in the US more than 7 million illegal 
immigrants from Mexico, with a migration rate of 
about 350,000 a year.
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NAFTA was supposed to create a growing Mexican 
middle class. However, the poor quality of jobs 
created in that country as the result of maquilas 
prevented this from happening. Wages in the ma-
quila manufacturing industry are traditionally lower 
than those in the non-maquila sector (this difference 
may be about 50%). Some studies and surveys 
indicate that 25% of American corporations were 
willing to use NAFTA to lower wages, induced by 
competition that forces them to lower costs. Even 
Mexican companies moved from central to north 
Mexico to take advantage of the low wages in that 
area, thanks to a pool of low-wage workers avai-
lable, against the traditional perception of a labor 
shortage in the region (Campell, 1999).
According to Villarreal (2011), wages in Mexico rose 
steadily from 1980 to 1995, drop 15.5% in 1996 to 
increase again after that until 2000, with increasing 
wage differences between skilled and unskilled wor-
kers. Vazquez (2004) indicates that real wages in 
Mexico decreased by 80% since NAFTA. This may 
be due to the reduced bargaining power of unions 
and government when determining the minimum 
wage. Low and stagnant wages in Mexico limited 
the demand for export from the US, with a negative 
impact on them. 
Wage inequalities among countries were supposed 
to reduce with NAFTA, as the result of the more acti-
ve commercial trade activity. The US labor demand 
curve would shift to the left while the Mexican curve 
would move to the right, and wages would adjust 
accordingly. But there is no evidence of reduction 
in wage inequalities between Mexico and the other 
two members of the treaty. 
The US labor market probably has beneficiated 
even less from NAFTA. The Congressional Budget 
Office in 1993 estimated a job lost due to NAFTA 
of about half a million, spread out over a decade. 
The Department of Labor estimated the impact on 
sectorial employment would be less than 2% of 
current sectorial employment. As shown in table 
2, the US located its labor intensive manufacturing 
industry in Mexico to take advantage of much lower 
wages. This is an important strategy of US corporate 
firms to provide cheap products to American consu-
mers, but at the expense of US workers. Mexican 
industry is too small and weak as to compete with 
the American industry and had no incentives to move 
to the US. After all, North American integration is a 
corporate driven process with 50 large firms corpo-
rations (mostly Americans) producing 70% of the 
trade, and this is what trade based on comparative 
advantages is all about: Mexico should specialized in 
the production of labor intensive products, while the 
US should produce the technology intensive ones.
Even though the Department of Labor considered 
this impact as negligible, they knew it was going 
to be concentrated by region and industry so that 
the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program (TAA) 
was created to help displaced workers through job 
training. By 1999 this program reported 238,051 
displaced workers, which they assumed underesti-
mated but yet not significant. Other studies support 
this finding (Burfisher et al., 2001). 
Table 2. Factorial analysis of exports, 1992 (%)
Canada United States Mexico
Natural Re-





Labor 49.1 27.2 31.7
Technology 23.1 54.2 35.2
Source: Berlinsky, J. (1996). 
The Economic Policy Institute reports a total of 
682,900 jobs displaced by 2010 due to the trade 
deficit with Mexico. This net jobs displacement in-
cludes those created by exports to Mexico. Most of 
the jobs displaced were, as expected, in manufactu-
ring industries (60.8%), especially in computer and 
electronic parts (22%) and motor vehicles and parts 
(15,8%). As for the regions, net job displaced was 
higher in Michigan (1% share of state employment); 
Indiana (0.81%); Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, New 
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Hampshire, Illinois and Alabama more than 0.60%. 
The US has not been able to recover those jobs in 
spite of the efforts made. 
Gary Johnson said in May, 2011, the jobs lost 
are those the US does not want. But Scott (2011) 
concludes that the steadily growing trade deficit 
the US has been experiencing with Mexico since 
NAFTA was implemented is a significant contribu-
tor to the current manufacturing crisis, which has 
lost 5.6 million jobs since year 2000. After all, the 
US-trade deficit with México has increased 485% 
in the period 1997-2010 and the net-jobs lost by 
566% in the same period.
 
As for wages, in 1992 the International Trade Com-
mission estimated an increase in the US aggregate 
real wages of 0.1 to 0.3%. The Congressional Bud-
get Office considered this impact would less than 
1%. In other words, impact on wages would also be 
negligible. The hourly nominal wage of the median 
worker grew by 10.1% during the period 1996-2002, 
and 12% between 1989 and 2010. However, pro-
ductivity grew up by 80% during the same period, 
suggesting that American workers are not perceiving 
the benefits of their effort. According to Mishel and 
Shierholz (2011), the reasons for these stagnating 
wages are the globalization process and related po-
licies oriented to provide cheap products rather than 
supporting jobs. This has lowered the bargaining 
power of unions, so that the ability of the economy 
to produce more has not being translated into better 
compensations and better working conditions for 
workers. As Bivens (2008) points out, displacements 
often cause income losses and permanent damage 
to worker’s earning power.
3. THE US-COLOMBIA FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT (US-COLOMBIA FTA) 
3.1 GENERAL IDEAS
The US-Colombia FTA is a treaty signed by the 
two countries in November 2006, approved by 
Colombia’s Congress in 2007 and by the US con-
gress in October 2011. According to proponents, 
this agreement will deliver sustained economic 
growth, increase investments, more and better 
jobs, protect workers´ rights11, exchange techno-
logy and information, and anti-corruption reforms 
to Colombia and will support more American jobs, 
increase the US exports and enhance the US 
competitiveness. Therefore its goals are similar to 
those in NAFTA. And the steps to reach them are 
similar too: gradually eliminate tariffs and non-tariffs 
barriers to the commercial trade and capital flows 
between the two countries. 
The US-Colombia FTA can be seen as part of the 
Enterprise for the Americas proposed by George 
Bush back in Jun 27th 1990, according to which a 
free trade region would be created starting with 
NAFTA and eventually extended to all other coun-
tries in the American continent. The Enterprise 
considered four main goals: gradual reduction of 
all barriers to commercial trade among countries 
to create the largest market with more than 700 
million consumers, in a clear reaction to the Eu-
ropean Union; an ambitious investment plan to 
industrialize Latin America; a plan to restructure 
the international debt of all these countries with the 
US, and environmental protection common policies. 
Four were the countries considered by the US to 
initiate this process: Colombia, Chile, Mexico and 
Venezuela. The reasons: open market governmen-
tal policies, such as promotion of exports; stable 
economic grow rates, low inflation and moderate 
external debt; political willingness to participate in 
the globalization process, moving from protectionist 
to free competition; unsuccessful attempts to link 
their economies to the European Union and Japan, 
and political stability (Londoño, 2010). Ramoni and 
Orlandoni (2002) evaluated the possibility of an 
American Union with NAFTA starting the integration 
form the North and MERCOSUR from the South, 
but concluded that the lack of correspondence 
11 The agreement provides for the protection of intellectual property 
rights on music, movies, and software from piracy in the digital en-
vironment, as well as state-of-the-art protection for U.S. trademarks.
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among agreements, along with strong economic 
and social inequalities across countries and pre-
vailing macroeconomic problems in the majority of 
them, seemed to be an obstacle to the integration 
of the western hemisphere. As for the four jaguars, 
as these four countries were known by the time, 
Mexico, Chile and now Colombia were able to in-
tegrate with the US while Venezuela has moved in 
a totally opposite direction since President Chavez 
started his socialist process.
As in Mexico, Colombia started to open its eco-
nomy years before the FTA with the US. With the 
Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) the US, 
unilaterally, granted trade preferences to Andean 
countries as a reward for their efforts against nar-
cotraffic. In 2002, the ATPA was replaced by the 
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication 
Act (ATPDEA), which granted free access to the 
US market to more than 6000 Colombian products. 
This Act lasted until 2006. In 2004 three countries, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru began the process to 
sign a free trade agreement with the US. While the 
President Correa’s political orientation has deviated 
Ecuador from that goal, Peru finally implemented 
a FTA in 2009. 
The US-Colombia FTA will create the third largest 
export market in Latin America and the 20th worldwi-
de, based on population. As with Mexico, Colombia 
and the US are considered complementary in terms 
of the products they trade: Colombia exports fruits 
to the US in return for grain; the US exports cotton, 
yarn and fabric to Colombia in return for apparel.
The International Monetary Fund data indicates 
that by year 2010 Colombia’s GDP per capita is 
five times smaller than the US GDP per capita. Its 
Gini coefficient is 0.12 points higher (0.58 compared 
to 0.46), with an illiteracy index of 6.8%. A healthy 
economy, Colombia’s international debt represents 
less than 30% of its GDP, much smaller that the 
US debt; its product had been growing at rates of 
about 4% to 6% in the last years, with the lowest 
inflation rate in Latin America, a high but declining 
unemployment rate and, unlike Mexican peso, 
Colombia’s peso tends to reevaluate (see table 3).
Table 3. 
The US and Colombia before the FTA (2010)
USA COLOMBIA
Per capita income ($) 47,198 9,462
GDP (rate of growth, %) 2.8 6.0
Population (millions) 311 45.5
Gini coefficient 0.46 0.58
Illiteracy index (%) 1.0 6.8
External debt (% GDP) 70.0 20.3
Average inflation rate (%) 3.0 3.6





Source: Elaborated by the authors based on information from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. 
According to the World Bank, Colombia is the third 
largest economy in Latin America, the fifth strongest 
economy based on GDP and number 15 based on 
per capita GDP. Its population of 45.5 million people 
is about one third of Mexico’s and seven times sma-
ller than the one is the US. Therefore, for the US it 
is probably not as economically attractive as Mexico 
back in 1992 or Brazil right now (193,300,000 peo-
ple). Besides, 40.1% of Colombia’s population is 
under poverty line and employment in the informal 
sector reached 32.7% of total employment in 2010. 
However, the 1429 Act approved in 2010 to lower 
the levels of informality seems to be working if we 
take into consideration that by 2000 more than 60% 
of workers were employed in informal activities.
Therefore, it is easy to see that inequalities bet-
ween Colombia and the US are similar to those 
observed between the last one and Mexico back in 
1992. However, in this new alliance there are other 
factors that make the difference and could play an 
important role in the direction of this relationship: 
There is not geographical proximity between the 
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two countries, Colombia is the oldest political and 
military ally of the US in Latin American, exception 
made during the conflict between the US and Pa-
nama, and it is the US most important trade partner 
in Latin America, after Mexico. 
Colombia has consistently had a surplus in trade 
balance and an almost negligible deficit with the US 
(see figure 1). Almost half of its exports go to the 
US (42.2% in 2010); 12.3% to the European Union, 
while its exports to Venezuela, former Colombia’s 
second most important trade partner, has been de-
clining to less than 4%. Imports come primarily from 
the US (26.2%), but at declining rate, China (12.9%) 
and Mexico (9.2%). A diversified economy, there are 
several products that make Colombia a well-known 
country worldwide: coffee and flowers, tobacco and 
cigarettes; nickel, coal, gold, emeralds, sapphi-
res and diamonds; textiles, apparels and leather 
products and, more recently, oil and gas. Actually, 
Colombia is the World’s second most important 
flower producer (the first US flower supplier) and 
has the fifth largest oil reserve in South America. 
On the other hand, Colombia is the US third most 
important partner in Latin America, after Mexico 
and Brazil. In 2010, American exports to Colombia 
were $12.1 billion, while imports were $15.6, with 
a deficit of about $ 3 billion. 
Like Mexico at the time of signing NAFTA, Colom-
bia exhibits political and economic stability, with a 
medium and steady rate of economic growth and 
no strong inflation problems and struggles with 
violence and narcotraffic. However, according to 
the Department of State, violence in Colombia has 
plummeted by no less than 40% in the last five 
years, thanks to the combined efforts of Colombia 
and the United States. 
Also like Mexico, during the 1990s Colombia was 
trying to replace its protectionist policy by an open 
market, after having the highest levels of tariffs in 
the Andean zone (36.6%, against 17% in Venezue-
la).therefore, as said before the US-Colombia FTA 
did not start in 2005 but in 1990 with the “apertura” 
introduced by President Cesar Gaviria, characte-
rized by gradually reducing trade taxes, imposing 
laws against unfair competition and creating free 
trade areas with several countries like Venezuela, 
Mexico and Chile. The primary goals were to increa-
se productive and debilitate oligopolistic structure of 
the domestic industry and to solve inequalities with 
a specialization toward labor intensive industries, 
as well as integrate Colombia to the continent and 
gain access to North America market. 
Figure 1. Colombian exports to and imports from the US
Source:Elaborated by the authors based on information from CEPAL 
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As for wages, the average real wage in Colombia 
increased 1.2% in 2009 and 2.5% in 2010. The real 
manufacturing wage index show the same trend, 
Figure 2. Wage evolution during the “apertura”
3.2 EXPECTED EFFECTS
According to the International Trade Commis-
sion, the US-Colombia FTA will open access to 
Colombian’s $166 billion service market, increase 
US exports to Colombia by $1.1 billion and expand 
the US GDP by $2.5 billion. Colombia’s economy is 
expected to grow at 4.2% a year; its exports to the 
US are estimated o move to $1700 million, and that 
about $2135 million will be invested in that country. 
Also, 380 thousand new jobs are expected to be 
created in Colombian, while the number for the US 
is not so precise. All this would mean more opportu-
nities for American providers and thousands of new 
jobs. But we must be careful since this Commission 
has already failed to properly estimate the impact 
of the free trade agreements with Mexico. 
Toro et al. (2005) used a multisectoral general 
equilibrium model to predict the impact of the FTA 
on the Colombian Trade Balance. Their results 
show an increase of at least 3 points of GDP in 
the commercial trade and foreign capital flows of 
no less than $2.3 billion until 2010. According to 
them, it is possible they underestimate the total 
impact of the agreement since this might generate 
new import and export activities, with a positive 
effect on investments and trade. On the other hand, 
several studies agree that the FTA will increase the 
Colombia’s trade balance deficit with the US, and 
that the economy will go up at a rate between 1 
to 4 percent a year [DNP (2003), Botero y López 
(2004), Cárdenas y García (2004), Niño (2004) and 
Martín y Ramírez (2005)]. Tovar (2004) predicts 
suggesting that the expansion in the Colombian 
labor market is not just based on new jobs but also 
better remunerations (see figure 2). 
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on information from ILO
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an increase in the domestic cars industry’s profits 
and substantial gain in consumers’ welfare after 
imported car tariffs drop from 200%.
Bussolo and Holts (2000) developed a model to 
predict the impact of Colombia entering the NAFTA. 
According to them Colombia could be the country 
that benefits the most, although the effects on em-
ployment are not so clear, due to the relatively small 
size of this market and its geographical location. 
Their model indicates that the treaty would intensify 
traditional patterns of comparative advantages for 
Colombia, so that the absence of appropriate policies 
might undermine modernization and compromise the 
economic development in that country. If what they 
predict is true, the story would repeat itself: labor 
intensive operations would be moved to Colombia, 
with the subsequence loss of jobs in the US and the 
creation of new but poor jobs in Colombia. Howe-
ver, geography may play a different role here: firms 
may decide to move to Colombia, not to ship final 
products back to the US but to other Latin American 
countries. And must of these firms will not be under 
the form of maquilas. In any case, capital inflows 
to Colombia will mean jobs not created in the US 
but in Colombia. In fact, like with Mexico, the US 
is the most important source of foreign investment 
in Colombia, with an average of $7 billion a year, 
and increasing. So far, these capital inflows have 
gone to mining and hydrocarbon projects, and just 
a small portion to maquilas. The Economic Policy 
Institute has estimated that the US-Colombia FTA 
will generate 55,000 displaced in the US.
Labor is an important issue in this agreement: 
both parts agree to preserve workers’ fundamental 
rights as stated by the International Labor Office. 
This includes technological assistance and training 
programs to increase workers’ productivity and 
reduce the risk of injuries; exchange of technology 
and information, as well as assistance to collect 
and improve labor statistics and mechanisms to 
protect and promote immigrant workers’ rights and 
wellbeing. And, once again, Colombia might benefit 
the most with the treaty, although those opposing 
it consider Colombian cannot be rewarded with a 
free trade agreement since its has failed to protect 
workers there.
Therefore, positive and negative effects are expec-
ted. Some sustain that the “aperture” has already 
destroyed the Colombian agricultural sector, which 
seems to be the algid point in this treaty. They also 
consider that sectors such as textile, footwear and 
metal mechanic industries have been negatively 
affected, since they are mostly formed my small 
and medium firms. 
Still, it seems the majority of the country is welco-
ming the agreement and thinks that Colombia al-
ready started receiving some benefits from FTA. Its 
real GDP per capita has been increasing from less 
$2,000 in 1969 to more than $4,000 in 2011, while 
the value for Venezuela, for example, although 
higher, has declined during the same period.
Right now Colombia has become a platform for US 
exports to other countries and a pole of attraction 
for domestic and foreign investment. With good 
access to credit and government support (ex-
change rate, access to tech) some sectors may 
beneficiate from FTA: coffee, flowers, fruits, sugar, 
vegetable oil, tobacco, fishing, cocoa, leather pro-
ducts. The expansion of the oil industry has been 
possible thanks to foreign investment. Of course, 
there exist sectors, like grains and dairy products 
that will need assistance and special conditions to 
become more competitive and survive the compe-
tition. For Colombia the success of the agreement 
will be based on whether or not small and medium 
firms are able to survive; after all, they represent 
63% of total employment. Improvement in several 
aspects is in order: infrastructure, education, quality 
control processes, protection to property rights, is 
just some of them. The Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats faced by Colombia are 
summarized in the following SWOT matrix shown 
in table 4.
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But, what is there for the US? It seems that for the 
US there are more disadvantages for not signing, 
than advantages for doing so. In this globalized 
world, the only way to protect a country’s market 
share is by offering special conditions to specific 
economies. Failing to do so would imply fewer 
chances to attract capitals and/or to allocate the 
goods and services they produce, with a negative 
impact on its employment and GDP, beyond the 
possible displaced these agreements may create. 
The US needs these agreements in order to keep 
its competitiveness and preserve its share in the 
international trade market. After all, Colombia has 
already signed several agreements with Korea, 
members of the EU and Canada, and is in the 
process of signing a new one with China. 
In other words, the US could sign these agree-
ments not to win, but not to lose. The ties between 
these two countries have two additional compo-
nents that may also help to explain the interest of 
the US on Colombia: the common fight against 
narcotraffic and the strategic geographical position 
of Colombia in the continent, reinforced by a mili-
tary alliance between the two of them. These are 
Table 4. SWOT Matrix




Educated and willing workers
Low cost of labor force
Exporting experience
Low inflation rate
Stable and favorable weather
Natural resources
Strong and stable financial system
Colombia-Peru-Chile stock market
Opportunities
Access to the US market
Foreign direct investments
Technological transfer from USA
Access to other markets (China, Panama, Venezuela, Peru, Korea) 
HARMFUL
Weaknesses
Infrastructure physical and technological
Quality control processes
Peso tendency to reevaluate




Competition (with US, China, etc.)
USS and Eurozone crises
Negative trends of international markets
Guerrilla (FARC)
Narcotraffic
Source: Compiled by the authors
elements that differentiate NAFTA from this other 
FTA and that may change the potential results of 
the new treaty. 
4. CONCLUSIONS
Quantitative and qualitative effects assessment of 
NAFTA on Mexico´s and the US economy is not 
an easy task. International and internal economic 
and political events in both countries and previous 
steps toward an open economy in Mexico may pre-
vent from isolating the effects of the treaty. Official 
studies tend to show positive results, while others 
are not so optimistic. In spite of this, the general 
perception is that NAFTA impacts on the US eco-
nomy were small while larger in Mexico. 
Evidence seems to indicate that NAFTA has 
brought modest economic and social benefits to 
Mexico´s economy as a whole, but not evenly 
distributed reinforcing the heterogeneity it was 
supposed to reduce. Job creation has not been as 
much as expected as to reduce migration, informa-
lity and regional, gender and ethnic inequalities. 
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Income inequalities persist as well as incentive for 
migration to the US. It is true that such inequalities 
may be due to other problems such as insufficient 
education, innovation and infrastructure issues, 
but NAFTA created many expectations about it 
and failed to fulfill them by offering global rather 
than local solutions. 
Higher power gained by transnational firms in Mexi-
co has entered strategic sectors and challenged 
government measures related to royalties, fees, 
profits, and eve taxes, forcing privatization of firms 
that end up being controlled by transnationals and 
introducing an evident bias in favor of private over 
public sector, which have weakened public policies 
instruments and labor union´s bargaining power. 
The results of that are lower wages and poor wor-
king conditions. 
Inflows of financial capitals into Mexico helped to 
develop an exporting sector unattached to the do-
mestic Mexican economy, offering poor quality jobs 
at low wages. The US has not seen the benefits 
of NAFTA. More than half a million net jobs have 
being lost and deficit in trade balance replaced the 
original surplus. 
For American firms, NAFTA has made easier and 
cheaper the access to row material and labor and 
has forced them, as well as Mexican firms, to be 
more competitive. Since it was signed, commercial 
trade between the US and Mexico has quadru-
pled. The economy of the NAFTA as a whole has 
increased more than 100% and the employment 
level has increased more than 27%. Therefore, at 
the aggregate level, results seem to be positive, at 
least for some members.
Regarding the labor market, if similar experiences 
repeat themselves every time the US negotiates 
free trade agreements offering more attractive con-
ditions for international capitals, the US-Colombia 
FTA can only mean fewer jobs for Americans and 
more but not necessarily better job opportunities 
for Colombians. 
People opposing globalization think of it as dis-
connecting the relationship between American 
corporate employers and their employees, and 
agreements like NAFTA protecting the interests 
of large corporate investors, while undercutting 
workers’ rights. The main winners of all these 
Agreements seem to be the large corporations. 
That explains why Microsoft, Coca-Cola, Wal-Mart 
and General Motors wrote letters to the congress 
to support the TPA.
However, there are factors indicating that the com-
mercial relationship between these two countries 
will not be characterized by maquilas, like happe-
ned with Mexico. So far Colombia has proven to 
be able to deal with the increasing capital inflows 
that this free trade means, including strong policies 
against narcotraffic money laundering. Benefits 
from the “aperture” are evident, even though it 
is not clear which of them are due to the US-
Colombia FTA. Product is growing fast, as well as 
employment. Most resources have been invested 
in activities different from maquila, which create 
better quality jobs. 
Probably the most challenging part of the TPA for 
Colombia will be to be able to protect property 
rights. With an informal sector that employs more 
than 30% of the workers, many of them engaged 
in activities that violate intellectual property rights, 
Colombia faces a dilemma. Another obstacle for 
Colombia may be the inadequacy of its current 
infrastructure (ports, roads, airports, etc.). Several 
projects have been initiated at this regard already, 
which probably would not have been undertaken if 
not for the FTA. Finally, Colombia needs highly qua-
lified workers and quality control processes to been 
able to compete with the USA, take advantage of 
all the opportunities the agreement will represents 
and overcome the difficulties it implies. 
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